

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01041A000100040230-6

Official Diary

Wednesday, 4 February 1953

1. Mr. Dulles gave a brief resume of the National Security Council Intelligence briefing and indicated that hereafter the CIA briefing would occupy the first fifteen minutes and General Bradley's briefing on the Korean war would take up the remaining fifteen minutes.

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I requested [REDACTED] to pass appropriate portions of this resume

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to [REDACTED] later called and indicated that [REDACTED] understood very clearly that the President intended General Bradley to give an Intelligence briefing on the Korean war only in the forthcoming briefing of Congressional members. It was [REDACTED] understanding that Bradley was not to brief the National Security Council as a regular procedure. This will have to be checked with Mr. Dulles.

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2. Attended IADs meeting.

3. Attended meeting with Admiral Radford. Prior to this meeting Mr. Dulles had reported on certain figures on seaborne trade entering China which, apparently, had been given by Admiral Radford to the President and the National Security Council. These figures seemed highly inconsistent with agreed estimates on this point. Accordingly, with the assistance of Messrs. Amory and [REDACTED] of O/RR, we prepared a summary of the [REDACTED] agreed papers, together with certain supplementary CIA estimates on such trade and forwarded the same to [REDACTED]. This point was discussed with Admiral Radford and the inconsistency between his figures and those of the agreed estimate was pointed out. It was agreed that Amory and [REDACTED] would meet with Captain Layton, Admiral Radford's Intelligence Officer, in an effort to reconcile these two sets of estimates.

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4. Also at the meeting with Admiral Radford, full agreement was reached to the effect that CIA would not participate in forthcoming Tripartite conferences on Southeast Asia and that the matters formerly dealt with by the Security Sub-Committee would hereafter be dealt with

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A separate memorandum for the record on this point has been prepared and given to Messrs. Dulles and Wisner.

5. Attended meeting of the IADs with Admiral Overesch. At the outset of this meeting, I commented that I was not satisfied that the T/O for Intelligence Staff proposed by [REDACTED] was adequate to perform the Intelligence functions which we, as representatives of the National Intelligence structure, would require from our North Asia Command, particularly in view of the increasing priorities given to the Asiatic portion of the Soviet bloc. We had not, as yet,

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pressed this point because we desired that the Command arrangements be established before surveying the Intelligence needs of the Command. We did, however, anticipate that [REDACTED] would require Intelligence specialists, such as scientific and economic experts, on his staff and this would not be possible were strategic division to consist of only three members. Later in the meeting arrangements were made for a survey by a representative of O/SI. Mr. Amory determined to defer raising the question of a survey by an economic specialist. During this discussion [REDACTED] raised questions with respect to the need for cover, relations with covert representatives, etc. We indicated that we were prepared to support any recommended T/O on its merits as a benefit to the Intelligence function and that we would also undertake to make appropriate arrangements in Washington for cover in such matters.

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6. In connection with the delivery of highly sensitive items to the President, [REDACTED] noted a serious security violation by a senior official. I reported this to Mr. Dulles and also requested [REDACTED] to report fully to [REDACTED] who would make recommendation for further action to be taken.

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